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THE RISE AND FALL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
RICHARD

A.

POSNER*

Academic law is an intellectually insecure field. It lacks a theoretical gyroscope and therefore wobbles, grabbing at the methods and
insights of other fields while buffeted by the political and ideological
currents of the day. I shall illustrate this thesis, and its paradoxical
corollary that law can be improved by being made a little less like law
and a little more like economics, with the changing shape and fortunes
of administrative law in the academy and in the judiciary.
The Constitution established a system of lawmaking that was
designed for a small eighteenth-century government of circumscribed
powers. An essentially three-headed legislature-Senate, House of
Representatives, and President-would enact statutes, but not many,
because of the transaction costs of tricameralist legislating. A tiny judiciary would make additional law by interpretation and by common
law rulemaking, but it would not make much additional law, because
of the well-known informational, remedial, legitimacy, and, again,
transaction-cost limitations of courts. I emphasize transaction costs as
impediments to ambitious lawmaking. Increasing the size of a legislature increases the costs of reaching agreement, and increasing the size
of a judiciary increases the costs of maintaining consistency and
direction.
You cannot have big government-the government that tries to
do more than secure the night watchman state-with just courts and
legislatures. So when the demand for a big (at first just bigger) federal
government arose toward the end of the nineteenth century, the constitutional mold had to be broken and the administrative state invented. Opponents of big government, emphasizing the quasi-judicial
powers of agencies, pointed to the constitutional illegitimacy and
political menace of an administrative state that would grab power
from the courts. Supporters of big government sought to allay these
concerns about the politicization of adjudication by depicting administrative agencies as arenas for the deployment of neutral expertise. Indeed, the supporters turned the tables on the opponents by noting the
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. I thank Cass Sunstein for helpful discussion of the topic and
many helpful comments on a previous draft.
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ideological character of the judiciary and contrasting it with the scientific neutrality to which the administrative process aspired; they
claimed that the administrative process would be less, not more, political than the judicial process. These "Progressives," champions of
technocratic public administration, triumphed with the coming of the
New Deal.
The struggle that I have just sketched, which defined the first
phase of academic thinking about administrative law, ended with the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. The Act was
a historic compromise. It signified the acceptance of the administrative state as a legitimate component of the federal lawmaking system,
but imposed upon it procedural constraints that have made the administrative process a good deal like the judicial. Even notice and comment rulemaking, the most conspicuous departure of administration
from adjudication, is in practice a lot more like litigation than like
legislation, although the fault (if that is what it is) is, as I shall point
out, not entirely that of the Act's draftsmen. The Act, a reaction to the
politicization of some agencies, such as the National Labor Relations
Board, imparted a considerable measure of political and ideological
neutrality to administrative law, much as the Taft-Hartley Act, enacted in the following year, imparted a considerable measure of political and ideological neutrality to labor law, correcting to a degree the
pro-union bias of the Wagner Act. World War II had created a yearning for normalcy-and, incidentally, had crushed the radical right because of its prewar defeatism and isolationism, and, the war's
aftermath crushed the radical left. The result of these war-induced developments was a temporary suspension of ideological conflict, which
allowed administrative law to be assimilated comfortably to a postformalist, post-realist, consensus era of American law. It was natural
that the focus of academic thinking about administrative law would
shift from the issues of politics, legitimacy, and policy that had dominated the earlier literature to issues important to completing the domestication of administration as law-such issues (all closely related
to each other) as the proper demarcation of the border between questions of fact and questions of law, the circumscribing of agency discretion, the need for reasoned explanation of agency decisions, and the
need for more definite standards, consistently administered, in order
to particularize the agencies' broad statutory mandates and thus make
administrative regulation more objective and predictable.
During this period of consensus, in which Professors Jaffe, Hart,
and Davis were the dominant voices in administrative law scholar-
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ship,' and Frankfurter and Friendly in the judiciary, few people bothered to ask whether the administrative agencies were accomplishing
what they were supposed to accomplish, whether what they were supposed to accomplish was worthwhile, and whether the actual consequences of administrative regulation were good or bad (and what the
standard of goodness or badness in regulation should be). These were
not procedural or doctrinal, or even constitutional, questions, so they
were unlikely even to occur to lawyers. They were unlikely to occur to
anyone the more that agencies were conceived to be, and were in fact,
like courts. No serious person asks whether we need courts; we obviously do. If agencies are just another form of the judiciary, handling
as it were the overload of cases that courts cannot handle either because of the sheer number or because some cases present issues that
baffle judges, no one is likely to ask whether we need agencies.
When ideological strife resumed in this country in the 1960s, the
administrative state was caught up in it. On the left, Ralph Nader and
his ilk, building on an earlier but heretofore rather ignored literature
on regulatory capture, began asking whether the agencies were the
zealous protectors of the public interest that they pretended to be and
whether there was not a need both to increase citizen involvement in
the existing agencies and to expand administrative regulation into new
domains, such as automobile safety. 2 On the right and increasingly in
the center as well and even in the center left, economists began questioning the missions of a number of the most prominent federal administrative agencies. They found that much of what the agencies did,
such as limiting airlines' entry into city pairs, regulating the prices of
rail and truck transportation, awarding broadcast licenses in exchange
for commitments to provide local programming, putting a ceiling on
the price of natural gas, and even fostering unionization and trying to
make advertising and labeling more informative, just was not worthwhile; the agencies were performing allocative functions, in transportation, labor, advertising, communications, energy, and other
important sectors of the economy, that the market could perform
more effectively and at lower cost. The real mission of the agencies,
the economists showed, here converging with Nader and his academic
allies such as the historian Gabriel Kolko, was to cater to powerful
1. The summa theologica of this era of administrative law scholarship is Professor Jaffe's
792-page treatise. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
2. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY ch. 3
(1990).
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interest groups, and no amount of procedural improvement would do
anything to change the situation.
The economic critique implied that academic thinking about administrative law had missed the point by failing to understand that
administrative agencies were fundamentally different from courts.
Agencies belonged to the interest-group state; they were political captives and instruments; they were agents of overregulation. They could
no more be improved (whether by better procedures or better personnel) than a private cartel or a stolen-car ring could be improved; making them work better would simply increase the drain on society's
wealth. The Naderites, in contrast, having no faith in markets, thought
that agencies weren't doing enough, or were doing the wrong thing, or
that we needed new and different agencies. But they agreed with the
economists that the academic lawyers had missed the boat by focusing
on the law on the books rather than on the law in action-the actual
operation and effects of administrative regulation.
The Naderite critique inspired reforms designed to make regulation more public-interested, for example by empowering citizens'
groups to obtain judicial review of regulatory actions and inactions.
The economic critique helped to power the deregulation movement,
which has achieved, though probably more as a result of fortuitous
technological and economic changes than of the power of economic
theory and evidence, some remarkable successes. Some agencies have
disappeared, such as the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Power
Commission, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. Others have
become shadows, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the National Labor Relations Board; others-notably the Federal Communications Commission and the banking agencies-have so far relaxed
their grip as to become almost deregulatory agencies. Others, including the Securities and Exchange Commission and the agencies that
regulate banks and other financial intermediaries, have been
marginalized by rapid growth in the variety and complexity of the regulated activities.
The accelerating deregulation of the American economy has been
masked by the rise of agencies concerned primarily with health and
safety, such as the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration, the Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, with environmental
amenities (the Environmental Protection Agency, but also, though
with less enthusiasm, the Army Corps of Engineers, under the prodding of various environmental laws), with discrimination, such as the
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and with retirement
and disability. Less obviously (though perhaps only less obviously)
protectionist than the old-line industry-specific agencies that felt the
deregulatory axe, these newer programs are legacies of Naderite and
other brands of leftism that flourished in the 1960s and 1970s and that
are now, some of them, embattled. But in addition the Immigration
and Naturalization Service has become busier of late because of heavy
legal and illegal immigration and the tightening of the immigration
laws. As further evidence that the administrative state is not inherently left-wing, the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the
1980s marked a notable expansion of administrative at the expense of
judicial authority.
So there is plenty of administrative regulation, probably more
than ever, though possibly with less aggregate impact (but who
knows?). Much of this regulation is subject, and has been subjected, to
economic critique, in particular the regulation of pollution and of job
safety and health and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
age; much of that regulation appears to be regressive, ineffectual, perverse, or all three at once. That is not yet the consensus view of legal
scholars, by any means; but the success of the economic critique in so
many of the older areas of regulation has forced administrative law
scholars to address the merits, and not merely the procedures or other
forms, of the surviving (and in some areas growing) regulation. Administrative law scholarship has acquired in consequence a more substantive, a more economic, and a more institutional cast. There is
much more interest in what works, and much less in the forms and
formalities of the administrative process except insofar as they shape
consequences in the real world.
The original form of the economic critique treated regulation
largely as a form of cartelizing, and this proved fruitful for many of
the industry-specific regulatory programs, such as the control of price
and entry by public utility and common carrier regulation, programs
preceding or created by the New Deal. This kind of regulation confers
concentrated benefits on the regulated industry (and sometimes on
important customer groups as well-such as beneficiaries of regulation-mandated cross-subsidies) while diffusing its costs much more
broadly, and so it is easy to explain this kind of regulation in terms of
interest groups. Much of the newer or surviving regulation, however,
exhibits the opposite pattern-diffuse benefits and concentrated costs
(most environmental regulation is of this character)-and so cannot
easily be assimilated to a model of regulation that is based on cartel
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and interest-group theory. Instead economists and political scientists
have tackled this kind of regulation with public-choice theory. 3 This
body of theory is most easily understood as simply the general principles of economic theory applied to the political arena, as distinct from
the application of highly specific subtheories, such as cartel theory or
interest-group theory (the latter, moreover, modeled on the former).
Public-choice theory is nowadays infused with a heavy dose of game
theory in recognition of the strategic character of the interactions that
determine public policy.
The point I wish particularly to emphasize is that cutting-edge
administrative law scholarship today looks very different from what it
looked like forty years ago; indeed, it looks a good deal less like legal
scholarship. We can see this by considering what are the vital issues in
administrative law scholarship today. One is how best to regulate
hazards to safety, health, and the environment. This issue, in a sense
inevitable simply because of the changing focus of regulation, has engaged the sustained and imaginative attention of such able economists
as Kip Viscusi and such able jurists as Stephen Breyer and Cass Sunstein. The cardinal findings of this literature are as follows:
1. The law fails to distinguish sufficiently between situations in
which transaction costs prevent risks to safety and health from being
internalized, as in the case of pollution and other environmental degradation, and situations in which they do not, as in the case of jobrelated hazards. Administrative regulation is much more easily justified in the first class of situations than in the second.
2. There may, however, be subtle sources of market failure in the
second class as well, sources identified for example by the growing
scholarship in behavioral economics. Behavioral economists (really,
economic psychologists) have identified quirks in human reasoning
which they believe impede the ability of people to think sensibly
about low-probability risks to health and safety. In addition, the adequacy of using normative economics ("cost benefit analysis") to monetize nonmonetary costs, such as reduced health or safety or a
diminution in the number of animal species, has been questioned.
3. Even those administrative law scholars who support active regulation of job safety and the environment recognize that the actual
performance of the regulatory agencies in these areas has frequently
been deplorable. Their criticisms are illustrated by the tables that list
3. See, e.g., Conference on the Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1992).
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the values (essentially the cost of compliance with an agency's safety
directives divided by the number of lives saved by compliance) that
different regulatory programs impute to a human life. The tables reveal enormous variance and irrational extremes.4 Any variance seems
largely irrational, since, allowing for some differences in antecedent
pain and suffering, death is death whatever the particular causal agent.
The agencies that fix the value of a human life at the high end of the
scale may actually be impairing human longevity, because the heavy
compliance costs implied by such valuations have the effect of regressive taxes, disproportionately reducing the real incomes of the poor5
and income and longevity are positively correlated.
4. Those who want to improve rather than jettison or curtail the
regulation of health, safety, and environmental entities have come up
with a variety of suggestions for reform, suggestions primarily institutional rather than doctrinal or even procedural in character. An example is Stephen Breyer's proposal for the creation of a high-level
federal administrative agency to coordinate the risk-reduction activities of the existing administrative agencies in an effort to iron out
some of the discrepancies in the agencies' valuation of human lives
6
and other intangibles.
This branch of administrative law scholarship draws more on economics and political theory than it does on law. But so, it turns out,
does much of the best scholarship concerned with the procedural aspects of the administrative process, including the scope of judicial review and the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication. This
scholarship has exposed a significant lag in judicial thinking relative to
academic. The most important administrative law decisions of the
Supreme Court in this period of growing sophistication of academic
thinking about administrative law include decisions authorizing preenforcement review of administrative rules (Abbott Laboratories7 ),
expanding, curtailing, and then expanding again the right to attack
administrative action in federal court (Morton,8 Lujan,9 Northeastern
Chapter10 ), invalidating the one-house veto of regulatory action
4. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1432-35
tbl. 1 (1996).
5. See Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996).
6. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION ch. 3 (1993).

7.
8.
9.
10.
sonville,

Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jack508 U.S. 656 (1993).
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(Chadha1"), insisting that agencies justify their about-faces (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'Associationl2), squashing intrusive judicial review
of agencies' procedures (Vermont Yankee 13), allowing federal criminal
sentencing policies to be consigned to an administrative agency (Mistretta14), and curtailing judicial review of agencies' interpretations of
their statutes (Chevron'5 ). The academic response to these decisions
has been shaped more by game theory and public choice theory than
by conventional legal theory. The most influential administrative law
scholars are interested in the actual or probable impact of these decisions on public regulation rather than in how they fit into a preexisting
structure of legal doctrine. They have pointed out, for example, that
insofar as administrative agencies now exercise a substantial amount
of the legislative power of the United States, and insofar as these
agencies are under far greater control by the President than by Congress, and insofar as federal judges are far more likely to enforce original legislative deals than agencies controlled by the President are, the
effect of decisions such as Chadha and Chevron that curtail federal
judicial review of agency determinations is to displace legislative
power into the executive branch-a paradoxical result since the authors of these decisions defend them by reference to the allocation of
powers in the Constitution, which endeavored to lodge the legislative
and executive powers in different branches.
As this discussion illustrates, the Court has ignored the lessons of
the recent administrative law scholarship. The law that best describes
the results in the Supreme Court's administrative law jurisprudence of
recent decades is the law of unintended consequences. I am sure that
the Court did not realize when it authorized pre-enforcement judicial
review of administrative rules in the Abbott Laboratoriescase that this
would curtail the use of notice and comment rulemaking because it
would require the agency to create a highly elaborate record in order
to withstand that review, whereas if review were postponed to an enforcement proceeding a record narrowly tailored to the issue in that
proceeding could be developed on the spot as it were, rather than in
advance. Or that the Court's endorsement of the "hard look" doctrine in Vermont Yankee would simply slow down the administrative
11. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
12. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
13. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
14. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
15. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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process with no offsetting gains in greater accuracy. 16 One wonders
whether the Court has any clue as to the consequences of its administrative law decisions for society. Maybe it doesn't think that that is any
of its business.
Those tables of imputed values of human life that I mentioned
bring to mind another, though somewhat muted, theme of modern
administrative law scholarship, and that is the management of sheer
volume. For example, as more and more federal judges were appointed to handle an increasing caseload, the number of different
judges involved in federal criminal sentencing grew (even though the
federal criminal caseload itself wasn't growing much), and this underscored the sentencing variance produced by the traditionally uncanalized discretion of the sentencing judge. So we got the sentencing
guidelines, which alter the relation between the federal district courts
and their administrative adjuncts, the federal probation service and
parole commission; the Sentencing Commission is the probation service and parole commission writ large. By laying down rules for sentencing, the Commission was able to centralize and rationalize the
sentencing process to a degree that the courts could never have done
by themselves. Sentencing is to an ineliminable degree arbitrary, and
courts are not comfortable making arbitrary determinations.
Earlier the Department of Health and Human Services had done
much the same thing in its domain as the Sentencing Commission was
to do with sentencing. The Department curtailed the discretion of the
hundreds of administrative law judges who make social security disability determinations by promulgating a detailed set of largely quantitative criteria, the "grid," to guide determination of entitlement to
disability benefits. I have urged a different response to the problem of
managing volume, and that is to strengthen the appellate review process within the administrative agencies in order to reduce the burden
of appellate review on the federal courts. Specifically, I have urged the
creation of a court of disability appeals-an interagency Article III
appellate court that would review disability determinations by the Social Security Administration, the Department of Labor, and other federal agencies, with further review by the federal courts of appeals
limited to determinations of issues of pure law. 17 The issues raised by
16. See Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978).
17. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 266-67
(1996).
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all these developments and proposals are, it should go without saying,
institutional and managerial rather than doctrinal or procedural.
The point that I made earlier about judicial disinclination to
make arbitrary determinations may help answer the vexed and unsettled question, one of great importance to the rulemaking activities of
the agencies, of how to distinguish between "legislative" rules, which
can be promulgated only after notice and comment rulemaking proceedings, and "interpretive" rules, which can be promulgated without
any such formalities, and therefore much more cheaply and swiftly.
For a rule to be interpretive it is not enough, I believe, that the rule is
consistent with the purpose of the statute that it is interpreting; for
that is equally true of any valid legislative rule. A valid interpretive
rule must in addition be derivable from the statute that it implements
by a process fairly to be described as interpretive; that is, there must
be a path that runs from the statute to the rule, rather than merely
consistency between statute and rule. A largely jurisprudential literature concerned with establishing the outer boundaries of what can
reasonably be described as judicial interpretation rather than judicial
legislation can help courts and agencies determine when a rule can be
described as a reasoning from the statute rather than an addition to
the statute. A specific period of limitations, for example, cannot be
derived from the statute establishing the right that is to be subjected
to a limitations period. It might be possible to reason from the statute
that the enforcement of the rights created by it should be subject to a
deadline, even that the deadline should be short or long relative to the
deadlines for enforcing other kinds of right. But the sorts of argument
and evidence available in an adjudicative proceeding (the usual form
in which interpretive rules are promulgated) lack the precision and
trenchancy necessary to derive a specific number of months or years.
And so with the precise height in feet of the retention fence for wild
animals that was before my court in the Hoctor case. 18 When the fixing of a rule requires either the kind of scientific or technical data
obtainable only in a rulemaking proceeding, or simply an arbitrary
judgment, the adjudicative process is unusable. Notice and comment
rulemaking must be employed, and the required rule is therefore a
legislative rather than an interpretive rule. So once again the courts
and agencies have to go outside the narrow precincts of traditional
legal analysis in order to answer a difficult question of administrative
law.
18. Hoctor v. United States Dept. of Agric., 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996)
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There are, then, despite deregulation, plenty of interesting questions of administrative law. But if I am right, they can be answered
well only by administrative lawyers who, like the participants in this
conference, are willing to cast beyond law's traditional limits for methods of analysis and sources of insight.

